Monthly Archives: January 2018

Nonprofit Fraud: Selling Donated Goods

By Charles Hall | Asset Misappropriation

Nonprofit fraud is real. Hard to believe? Yes. But it happens.

Sometimes nonprofit embezzlers sell donated goods. Today, we examine how nonprofit employees can steal assets rather than cash and how you can prevent such thefts.

Nonprofit Fraud

Several workers at a California Goodwill pled guilty to taking over $15 million. Their scheme involved the selling of donated goods by the barrelful to private dealers who sometimes wheeled tractor trailers up to the rear of Goodwill stores.

The dealers sold most of the goods in Mexico. The thefts–involving seven primary culprits, four of whom were sisters–occurred over a twenty-year period that started in the mid-70s.

So how were the fraudsters caught?

One culprit went through a bitter divorce, and the husband disclosed the scheme to authorities.

Nonprofit Fraud Control Weakness

The article describing this case did not provide details of the store operations, but it appears–at the time–inventories of donated goods were not properly documented. When assets, of whatever form, are not inventoried, they are more likely to disappear.

Lessening Nonprofit Fraud

Account for all inventories. Also, clothing that is sold in bulk should be documented. So each time a truck backs up to a store, the activity should be recorded—who received the goods, the sales price, who approved the sale, why the goods were sold in bulk. The store should have a policy that cash is not to be received for such sales.

Consider adding a whistleblower hotline. Nonprofit employees sometimes see signs of theft. Make it easy for them to report fraudulent activity. Doing so creates the camera effect. 

Also, install a security camera that records all loading dock activity.

Note–This case was adjudicated in the 1990s, and Goodwill has, since that time, made significant improvements to its controls.

Convert and Combine Word and Excel Files Video

By Charles Hall | Technology

Do you ever need to convert and combine Word and Excel files into one PDF? With Adobe Acrobat DC you can do so. Here is a video demonstrating how you can convert different types of documents into one PDF.

Nonprofit Bid-Rigging and Kickbacks

By Charles Hall | Corruption , Fraud

In this article, we look at a nonprofit bid rigging case. (Some people refer to this as bid rig.) We sometimes think of nonprofit fraud as nonexistent. After all, these are the good guys. But today we see that nonprofit theft does occur–and to the detriment of those most in need.

Nonprofit Bid Rigging Case

Some nonprofit leaders prey on not-for-profit entities, harming the very people the organization is designed to help.

One such nonprofit leader was charged with bid-rigging, receiving kickbacks, and making fraudulent payments to vendors.

The Department of Justice charged a “former director of operations at…a Manhattan substance abuse treatment center, with bid rigging, conspiracy to defraud, and income tax evasion, in connection with a conspiracy to embezzle approximately $2.34 million from the organization over an eight-year period.”

The Department of Justice stated the charges stemmed from the director “conspiring with several outside vendors to rig bids and allocate contracts awarded by”  the nonprofit “for the supply of food, meat, health and beauty supplies, baby supplies, office supplies, printed materials, janitorial supplies, and medical supplies from 1990 until at least April 1998.” According to the charge, the director “steered nearly $10 million in contracts to those vendors.” No small bid rigging case.

The director was charged with taking kickbacks totaling at least $364,000 in cash or goods and services from vendors to ensure receipt of contracts. 

The Department of Justice went on to say, the director and seven vendors embezzled at least $2 million from  the nonprofit “by issuing false and fraudulent purchase orders to each of the seven vendors, who in turn issued corresponding invoices for goods and services that were never delivered or provided.”

Later, the director pleaded guilty to bid rigging, fraud, and tax charges.

What was the harm to the nonprofit’s 600 substance abuse patients? Well, money that should have aided the needy went into the pockets of fraudsters.

Bid Rigging Control Weaknesses

The first weakness was having a leader who was concerned more about his wealth than the people he served. Auditors often refer to this as the tone at the top–it’s the ethical makeup of those in charge. COSO calls it the control environment. Without a positive, honest culture, fraud is more likely to occur.

The second weakness was the bidding process never happened. There’s a reason for bidding: It keeps everyone honest, and it ensures the lowest price for the organization.

The third weakness was a lack of accounts payable controls (or the circumvention of such policies, if they existed). Collusion between an organization’s leaders and vendors can wreak havoc. In such cases, the vendors send invoices, but no service or product is provided. Since someone in the nonprofit is approving the invoice (with knowledge the invoice is fictitious), there is no gatekeeper, no one to prevent the theft. The person approving the invoices is aiding in the fraud.

What are the fixes for a bid rigging case such as this one?

Bid Rigging Fixes

First, fire unethical leaders. Nonprofits can’t afford the reputational damage—or the monetary losses.

Second, solicit (real) bids. Sealed bids should be received and opened in a public meeting.

Third, ask board members to review and vet the nonprofit’s vendor list, especially those vendors receiving payments over a certain threshold (e.g., $50,000). Alternatively, ask your external or internal auditors to verify the work of key outside vendors.

Cash Receipts Theft: Supervisor Steals

By Charles Hall | Asset Misappropriation

In this article, I discuss cash receipts theft and how you can lessen this threat.

Sometimes the person you hire to prevent theft is the one stealing. This is one of the dangers of a trusted bookkeeper. Below I provide a real-life story of a cash receipts supervisor on the take.

Cash Receipts Theft

Is your cash receipts supervisor taking your cash? I once worked on a case where this person took over $300,000.

Cash Receipts Supervisor

Many businesses funnel cash receipts to a supervisor who counts the money from each cash drawer and compares the funds to the daily receipts. The purpose of this step is to ensure no front-desk clerks are stealing.

The cash collections supervisor has usually worked a cash drawer in the past. So she knows all about how the receipts enter the system and how they are deposited.

Typical Deposit Cycle

The collections process often works as follows:

1. Money is collected at the front cash-collection desks and placed in the cash drawers that are assigned to each clerk; receipts are written for each payment
2. These clerks tally their collections at the end of each day and reconcile the monies in their cash drawers to the receipts written
3. The daily reconciliation for each cash drawer goes to the cash receipts supervisor who recounts the funds received and reconciles collections to the receipts written (performing the same reconciliation as the front desk clerks)
4. The cash receipts supervisor creates a deposit slip for all funds collected (if there are seven cash drawers, then the deposit slip represents the total collections for all seven cash drawers)
5. The cash receipts supervisor gives the checks and cash and deposit slip to a courier to take to the bank
6. The courier receives a bank deposit receipt from the bank
7. The courier provides the bank deposit receipt to the cash receipts supervisor (so she can compare the bank deposit receipt with the copy of the deposit slip–to ensure the courier did not steal any funds in transit)

Cash Receipts Supervisor Theft

So how can the cash receipts supervisor steal funds in the above scenario?

In the case I worked on, the supervisor also reconciled the bank statement. After step 3., but before step 4., she would steal the cash and then lessen the deposit slip accordingly. So, if she took $2,200, the deposit slip would reflect the total daily collections less $2,200.

You’re thinking, “But then the bank account would not reconcile since the computers have recognized the front-desk collections?” You are correct—unless someone monkeys with the bank reconciliation. And that’s what she did. The supervisor adjusted the reconciling items–on the bank reconciliation–to cover up the stolen funds. The scheme worked until the annual audit.

When the auditors tested the outstanding items on the bank reconciliation, they could not tie substantial amounts to the subsequent bank statement. Generally, outstanding reconciling items clear the subsequent month’s bank statement—but large amounts on the year-end bank reconciliation could not be accounted for (because they were fictitious).

When confronted, the clerk confessed to her theft and method.

So what was the control weakness that allowed the cash receipts theft?

Cash Receipts Theft Control Weakness

The weakness was the cash receipts supervisor who had custody of assets (cash) also performed the reconciliation of the related bank account.

Correcting the Control Weakness

The person reconciling the bank statement should not also handle cash. It’s also a good idea to perform surprise tests of the receipting records. Doing so puts everyone on notice. The receipt employees know someone can appear at any time and review their work.

For additional assistance, see my article about how to audit cash.

The Camera Effect Keeps Everyone Honest (Learn How)

By Charles Hall | Fraud

You can use the camera effect to kill fraud. Today I tell you what the camera effect is and how you can use it to reduce theft.

People are more prone to steal if they think no one is looking. But the camera effect is a powerful deterrent. So what is it? When others see the actions of an employee, he changes positively.

43% of fraud detection comes by way of tips. This is why whistleblower programs are the number one way to reduce theft. Time and time again, the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners’ surveys show that whistleblower programs lessen the number of and dollar amount of frauds. Employers provide 1-800 numbers whereby employees can anonymously report potential red flags 24/7. So why would a telephone number reduce fraud?

The camera effect.

Use the Camera Effect to Kill Fraud

We know that when potential fraudsters believe their thefts will be seen, they stay clean. No one wants to go to jail. No one desires to embarrass themselves or their family members.

The key is to introduce the threat of discovery.

This is why whistleblower programs are effective. When in place, such programs make employees feel that others see their actions. For example, if I make $40,000 a year, but I buy an $80,000 vehicle, my fellow employees (at least some) know this is a fraud signal. Now someone can report this signal using the whistleblower program. Think of the whistleblower programs as lots of roving cameras recording and communicating actions in real time. Now employees believe, “If I take, I will be seen.”

When I teach fraud prevention classes, I stand in front of the room and turn a security camera on. It whirls and turns, making class members feel as though they are being recorded. It’s funny; people act differently. They sit up, fix their hair, smile. After the camera rotates a couple of times, I say, “The camera is not hooked up to anything. You are not being recorded.” What did I do? I made them think they were being taped.

My teaching point: We want employees to believe their actions are visible. The camera effect causes positive actions.

Examples of the Camera Effect

Here are examples of fraud prevention steps that create the camera effect:

• Someone outside of the accounts payable department randomly selects ten cleared checks each month and reviews the payee, the signature, and the invoice support (let the accounts payable personnel know that this procedure will be performed periodically)
• Mail the bank statements to someone outside of accounting who opens them and inspects the contents before providing the statements to the accounting department 
• An outside CPA or CFE performs surprise tests of accounting information twice a year, picking whatever area she desires to inspect (now everyone knows their work is potentially subject to review)

Your Camera Effects

What are you doing to create the camera effect? White-collar crime is a real threat to your organization.