Monthly Archives: November 2017

Wire Fraud Transfer
Nov 04

Wire Transfer Fraud: Prevent It

By Charles Hall | Asset Misappropriation

The Theft: Wire Transfer Fraud

In one of the simplest thefts I’ve read about, a nonprofit administrative officer wired $6.9 million from an Ohio bank account to a private Austrian account. In this post, I’ll show you how wire transfer fraud occurs and how to prevent it.

Wire Fraud Transfer

Stealing a Cool $6.9 Million

The nonprofit administrator originated with the wire with a fax, taking less than an hour. Since the officer was authorized to make wire transfers, no one at the bank questioned the transaction–until it was too late. 

The fraudster landed in Austria, called his wife and said, “I’m not coming home.” Interestingly, the wife called the police and turned in her husband. He later came back to the states of his own volition. I guess, after a few boat rides down the Danube, he missed his family. Did he go to jail? Yes.

The Internal Control Weakness

The nonprofit entity did not establish appropriate controls over cash wire transfers. One person (by himself) could move funds.

Preventing Wire Transfer Fraud

The fix for this weakness is to require (at least) two persons to consummate all wire transfers.  

As you think about wire transfers, consider that they can originate with:

  • Faxes,
  • Phone calls,
  • Personal visits to banks, and
  • Computers

Determine how your bank handles wire transfers, and craft your internal controls accordingly.

Prevention Steps

Organizations should do the following to mitigate wire transfer fraud:

  • Require the bank to limit daily wire transfer amounts (e.g., $25,000 per day for each employee)
  • Require two persons to consummate all wire transfers to external parties (an essential control in my opinion)
  • If the wire transfer request is made with a phone or fax, require the bank to call your organization back before the wire transfer is consummated
  • The bank should require the use of unique passwords to access wire-transfer software; consider using a bank that provides bank token keys (small hand-held devices that generate unique identification numbers; these numbers are required to make wire transfers)
  • Restrict bank accounts so that wire transfers can be made only to bank accounts of the organization (e.g., transfer from operating bank account to payroll bank account)
  • Have someone peruse the daily bank account activity (using online access); at a minimum, reconcile bank statements in a timely fashion (large organizations should consider reconciling bank accounts more frequently than once a month; some reconcile daily)
  • Require sufficient documentation for all wire transfer journal entries; require a second-person review of these entries
  • Consider using a dedicated computer for all wire transfers; do not use this machine for any other purpose (malware is often picked up by computers as users visit tainted websites)
  • Use all bank-provided wire transfer controls
  • Any transactions over a certain high dollar amount (e.g., $50,000) must have the approval of the business owner/CEO

If you’re an auditor, consider–as you audit cash–whether these controls are in place.

As you can see, wire transfer fraud can be extremely damaging. Consider whether you have sufficient controls to prevent this theft. 

Skimming cash payments
Nov 02

Skimming Cash Payments: Prevent It

By Charles Hall | Asset Misappropriation

Skimming cash payments is a common theft, especially if receipting controls are lax. Here’s how the theft occurs and how you can prevent it.

The Theft: Skimming Cash Payments

Your cash clerk is skimming cash as it comes across the counter. He does so by:

  1. Not issuing a cash receipt, or
  2. By using a second cash receipts book

Theft of cash

In the first instance, the clerk knows which customers expect a receipt and which ones don’t. By not issuing a receipt he (the clerk) can put the cash in his pocket and–at the end of the day–walk out the door. He is careful to write off any related receivable (making an adjustment in the accounting system to reduce the customer’s receivable balance). As a result, the customer receives no bill for nonpayment. The clerk knows that no one–such as a supervisor–monitors receivable adjustments. Also, the business has no security camera.

In the second instance, the clerk has two physical receipt books, one for checks and one for cash (though everyone in the business thinks he has just one). The checks are deposited by the clerk into the business’ checking account and the cash is stolen. The customer receives a receipt whether he pays by check or cash and is unaware of the two receipt books. Again, the collections clerk writes off–by making an entry in the receivable software–the customer receivable. The result? The customer has a $0 balance and the clerk skims the cash.

The Internal Control Weakness

In the first instance (no receipt is issued), no one is monitoring the adjustments to the receivable accounts. And no one is tracking the receipt books issued (or being used). Also, the business has not installed a security camera to record the theft of funds by the clerk.

In the second instance (use of two receipt books), again, no one is monitoring the adjustments to the customer receivable accounts. And, again, there is no camera to record the use of the second receipt book.

Prevention of Cash Skimming

Have someone, such as a supervisor in the collections department or the controller outside the department, monitor daily adjustments to customer receivable accounts. The clerk should know that his receivables work (including any adjustments to receivables accounts) is being monitored. If the business is small, the owner should request a daily or weekly printout of all adjustments to the receivable accounts.

Install a camera to record all actions of your cash collection clerks.

These simple steps will greatly reduce the threat of clerks skimming cash payments.

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